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Chicago Booth School of Business. In spite of
this upcoming transition “from policymaker to
academic,” my remarks on the challenges for
monetary policy in the European Monetary Union
(EMU) are from the policymaker’s perspective.
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
AND ITS LESSONS FOR 
MONETARY POLICY
The financial crisis has brought the “monetary
policy consensus” formed in the years prior to
the crisis under scrutiny (Bean et al., 2010). The
framework of monetary policy differed signifi-
cantly from one central bank to another. Never  -
theless, across the board their primary objective
was price stability—defined as a stabilization of
the inflation rate at around 2 percent across a
horizon of approximately two years. Steering
short-term interest rates was considered a suffi-
cient means of achieving this target. Central bank
forecasts played a key role in monetary policy
decisionmaking, with monetary aggregates
increasingly taking a backseat in many forecast
models.
Furthermore, capital markets were mostly
assumed to be efficient, meaning that financial
imperfections and their potential macroeconomic
F
our years ago, I was invited to give a
speech in Paris. Its title—“From
Academic to Policy Maker”—referred
to the fact that I started out as an aca-
demic (Weber, 2007). I began that speech by men-
tioning a number of other academics who went
on to become central bankers: Mervyn King, Ben
Bernanke, Janet Yellen, Bill Poole, and Otmar
Issing, to name but a few.
I continued by analyzing why there are so
many academics in monetary policy. James
Bullard, by the way, is another case in point,
whom I did not mention at the time because he
was not yet in his current position. One of the
main reasons why, over the past years, academic
researchers have been taking up leading positions
at central banks is that monetary policy itself has
been heavily influenced by the findings of aca-
demic research. During the financial crisis, mone-
tary policy and economies across the world have
benefited significantly from these insights since
they have helped us to swiftly apply the appro-
priate policy responses to contain the crisis. Con  -
versely, the crisis has also raised important issues
for academic research in monetary economics as
well as in other fields.
As of next month [May 2011], after seven
years as a policymaker, I shall be taking up the
position of a faculty member of the University of
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inefficiencies, such as asset price bubbles, were
considered possible, but the majority view was
that monetary policy could do little to counter-
act such developments.
Microprudential supervision was regarded
as a sufficient means of containing risks in the
financial sector. Monetary policymakers should
intervene only after a financial crisis had occurred,
minimizing the macroeconomic damage through
resolute interest rate cuts.
Even though monetary policy proved indis-
pensable and highly successful in containing the
crisis and preventing a meltdown of the financial
system, events have cast doubt on this consensus.
The question now is whether and to what extent
monetary policy should take account of financial
market developments before a crisis occurs
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011c; also see the follow-
ing section). Let me elaborate on some aspects of
this in greater depth.
A Stronger Role for Financial Markets
in Monetary Policy Analysis…
Given the genesis of the crisis, it is undeniable
that monetary policy with too short a policy hori-
zon can fail to take account of financial imbal-
ances that eventually spill over to the real economy,
thus jeopardizing price stability. So, how should
monetary policy incorporate the experience of
the crisis into its decisionmaking process?
In the pre-crisis phase, monetary policy deci-
sions were often based on models in which the
financial sector played only a minor or no role at
all. Therefore, an obvious and important lesson
from the crisis is that the theoretical and empiri-
cal foundations of monetary policy must place a
greater emphasis on both the banking sector and
financial imperfections.
As regards the Eurosystem’s monetary policy
strategy, the monetary pillar already contains
major elements of such an approach. In the more
recent past, the Eurosystem has stepped up its
efforts to continually enhance its monetary analy-
sis (Papademos and Stark, 2010). The aim is to
identify irregularities in the patterns of a number
of variables, since an unusual pattern in loan
developments and monetary aggregates can pro-
vide valuable indications of excessive credit
growth. This requires, among other things, an
extension of the usual decisionmaking horizon,
as financial distortions often build over a fairly
long period. As a result, monetary policy should
become more symmetrical over the financial
cycle and can thus make a key contribution to
financial stability (Weber, 2010a).
…A Separate Toolkit for Financial
Stability…
However, this alone is insufficient to ensure
financial stability. Until the crisis, the majority
view had been that asset price bubbles are diffi-
cult to identify in a timely manner and that inter-
est rates are too blunt a tool to burst such bubbles
at an early stage. These reservations have not
been invalidated by the crisis and, therefore, the
debate on how to better prevent financial crises
turned to the specific incentives within the finan-
cial system and the existing supervision, which
focuses primarily on individual institutions, as
these may have encouraged the buildup of debt-
financed imbalances. Thus, a greater emphasis
should be placed on macroprudential analysis
and regulation (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011b, and
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010).
The aim of macroprudential policy is to contain
systemic risk, thus strengthening the resilience
of the financial system as a whole. This approach
is designed to ensure that externalities within
the financial system, notably the procyclicality
and interconnectedness of financial institutions,
can be addressed appropriately.1 Consequently,
existing supervisory tools must be expanded or
adjusted to prevent systemic risk from arising in
the future and to considerably reduce the likeli-
hood of credit and asset price bubbles.
…Price Stability: Still the Primary
Objective of Monetary Policy
Against this background, monetary policy and
its tools must remain focused on price stability
Weber
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1 A range of tools aimed at curtailing both procyclicality and network
risk is currently under discussion. See Bank for International
Settlements (2010) and Galati and Moessner (2011).and should not be overburdened with other objec-
tives. In fact, the credibility of monetary policy
depends not only on the clarity of its objectives
but also on transparency regarding its limitations.
Adopting financial stability as an additional,
independent monetary policy objective runs the
risk of arousing unrealistic expectations about
the effectiveness of monetary policy tools. Never  -
theless, central banks as institutions may still be
given the additional task of pursuing financial
stability, as long as they also have the appropriate
set of additional independent tools available to
them. Indeed, central banks’ expertise constitutes
a forceful argument for them to continue to play
a prominent role in analyzing and assessing finan-
cial stability. The advantage of having indepen  -
dent tools for price stability and financial stability
is evident when there is a need for monetary and
macroprudential policies to be adjusted in differ-
ent ways. Nevertheless, as developments in money
and financial markets are of key importance for
both monetary policy and macroprudential policy,
there are likely interdependencies that should be
taken into account. For example, bank lending is
important not only for the monetary transmission
process but is also a link for macroprudential
policy. This creates the opportunity for policy
decisions in both spheres to complement each
another, but it also harbors the danger of them
counteracting each other or even canceling each
other out.
There is no single answer to the question of
how necessary or advantageous a coordination
of policy areas would be (Committee on the
Global Financial System, 2010). Recent research
has provided some initial clues and corroborates
the view that the inflation rate can be stabilized
quite well if macroprudential policy has its own
tools and works alongside monetary policy
(Beau, Clerc, and Mojon, 2011, and Christensen,
Meh, and Moran, 2010).
However, harmful effects with respect to infla-
tion rate volatility can arise if monetary policy-
makers ignore the impact of macroprudential
tools on the financial markets (see Angelini, Neri,
and Panetta, 2010). If central banks make deci-
sions regarding both macroprudential and mone-
tary policy tools, additional fluctuations in the
inflation rate compared with the monetary policy
status quo can be virtually ruled out, and such
fluctuations could even be reduced overall (see
also Bean et al., 2010).
These preliminary results should be inter-
preted with caution. First, the underlying dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models only
approximately reproduce the complex interac-
tions between the real and the financial sectors.
Second, such research is only in its infancy; at
present, only a few models allow a simultaneous
analysis of monetary and macroprudential policy
(see Beau, Clerc, and Mojon, 2011). Nevertheless,
the results confirm that there should be a clear
allocation of objectives and tools to achieve the
aims of both policies. Assuming that there will be
a satisfactory exchange of information between
both monetary and macroprudential policymakers
in the future, the existing studies give no cause
to fear that the objective of price stability must
be compromised.
Price Stability Should Still Be
Understood to Mean Low Inflation Rates
Even though the pre-crisis consensus regard-
ing price stability as the primary objective of
monetary policy remains valid, it can be asked
whether the experience of the crisis should have
implications for the specific form that the objec-
tive of price stability takes. Specifically, there
have been concerns that the credible commitment
to ensure a low rate of inflation might restrict the
leeway for monetary policy stabilization, since
in the event of massive interest rate cuts the lower
bound for nominal interest rates would be hit
quite quickly. Two competing approaches have
been suggested to deal with this alleged short-
coming: a higher inflation target (Williams, 2009,
and Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro, 2010)
and a switch to targeting the price level or, more
precisely, the price-level path.2 Neither of these
two alternatives convinces me. 
As regards a higher inflation target, it is not
only the substantial and ongoing welfare losses
accompanying a rise in the inflation target that
Weber
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2 Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) already proposed price-level
targeting in connection with the deflation experienced in Japan. argue against this proposal but also, above all,
the loss of credibility for monetary policy associ-
ated with such a discretionary measure (Weber,
2010b). The resulting destabilization of inflation
expectations would make it significantly more
difficult for the central bank to achieve its (pos-
sibly higher) inflation target and to safeguard
macroeconomic stability.
Compared with a strategy of inflation target-
ing, price-level targeting does offer a number of
advantages, at least in theory. It opens up the
option of influencing private sector inflation
expectations and thus of combating deflationary
risks in the event of a crisis. However, it is doubt-
ful whether a change in the target specification
in the event of acute deflationary risk would be
suitable for achieving the desired positive effect
on private sector inflation expectations (Walsh,
2010). A more serious problem is that a strategy
of price-level targeting is associated with a few
additional drawbacks compared with optimal
monetary policy, casting doubt on whether such
a change of strategy would be beneficial (see
Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011a, and Gerberding,
Gerke, and Hammermann, 2010).
All in all, this means that neither raising the
inflation target nor switching to price-level target-
ing would be appropriate from an economic sta-
bility point of view. Instead, this problem must be
tackled at its root; the existing wrong incentives
and regulatory loopholes must be eliminated to
render crises less likely and less severe. It is, in
any case, questionable whether the leeway avail-
able to monetary policy at the lower bound of the
nominal short-term money market rates actually
was that limited. The effectiveness of central
banks’ unconventional measures during the crisis
gives no cause to view the lower bound of the
interest rate as a binding restriction on the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy.
PARTICULAR LESSONS FOR
MONETARY POLICY IN THE
EURO AREA 
All the issues I have mentioned until now
concern more or less all central banks and every
monetary policymaker. I now turn my focus to
the particular challenges for monetary policy in
the euro area. These arise from the sovereign
debt crisis, which is the major challenge for eco-
nomic and monetary union. The circumstances
surrounding the debt crisis are aggravating the
conduct of the Eurosystem’s common monetary
policy, which is geared toward maintaining price
stability in the euro area as a whole.
Heterogeneity as a Challenge for
Monetary Policy 
One of the aggravating factors is heterogeneity
in terms of growth, inflation, and competitive-
ness. With regard to the euro-area countries’ eco-
nomic performance, we are currently observing
a widening divergence. Broadly speaking, there
is a considerable growth gap between the core
and the periphery, or to put it more precisely,
some peripheral countries of the euro area.
In my view, the economic heterogeneity of
the euro area is a non-issue. Why should hetero-
geneity be a problem for the single monetary
policy? After all, the dispersion of growth rates,
as measured by the weighted standard deviations
of quarterly growth rates, is not significantly
greater than in the first years of the EMU. With
regard to inflation variance, we now see even
lower values than then. Furthermore, the U.S.
economy is characterized by considerable hetero-
geneity, too, and that does not impede the Federal
Reserve’s monetary policy, either. And in much
the same way as the Federal Open Market Com  -
mittee is focused on the United States as a whole,
the Governing Council of the European Central
Bank must take a euro-area–wide perspective:
While national developments have to be taken
into consideration, monetary policy cannot be
tailored to the specific needs of individual mem-
ber states.
The real problem with heterogeneity—and
that is a concern to me—is that a number of
countries have obviously failed to meet the obli-
gations and requirements of a currency union.
The persistent problems of countries in refinanc-
ing their debt are only the symptoms of the prob-
lems, not the problem itself. The financial crisis
Weber
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member countries— developments that were
already in existence before the crisis: too much
public spending, unproductive use of capital
inflows, loss of competitiveness. These were just
some of the shortcomings that had been carelessly
neglected, not least by the financial markets. Pain  -
ful adjustment processes, including structural
reform and budget consolidation, are essential to
restore the ability of the countries concerned to
live up to the demands of the single monetary
policy.
Fiscal Stabilization Measures Were
Necessary but They Undermined the
Basic Founding Principles of the EMU
Ensuring financial stability in the euro area
required and justified fiscal aid for Greece and
the establishment of a temporary stabilization
mechanism. Nevertheless, these particular meas-
ures have undermined the foundations of the
EMU.
The establishment of the EMU was based on
principles deemed necessary to make the euro a
stable currency. According to the principle of
subsidiarity, economic policies other than mone-
tary policy remain the responsibility of national
governments. With regard to fiscal policy, rules
and institutional arrangements were established
to ensure sound fiscal policies in the member
states. Furthermore, a “no-bailout” clause stipu-
lated the national responsibility of each country
for repaying its own public debt.
Rules for sound public finances are of partic-
ular importance in a monetary union since the
incentives for excessive borrowing are even greater
in a monetary union than they are anyway. Exces  -
sive borrowing can also place a strain on the
conduct of a stability-oriented monetary policy.
Unsound public finances are the Achilles’ heel
of a monetary union of independent states.
Purchases of government bonds for monetary
policy purposes, for example, harbor the risk of
blurring the boundaries between monetary and
fiscal policy, particularly given high government
deficits and debt levels. Such actions might harm
the credibility of monetary policy. A little earlier,
I said that monetary policy must remain focused
on price stability and should not be overburdened
with other objectives. This principle applies not
only with respect to financial stability, but also
fiscal policy.
During the financial crisis, the Eurosystem—
like the central banks of other major economic
regions—took unconventional monetary policy
measures on an unprecedented scale. The ample
provision of liquidity was effective in offsetting
the consequences of the abrupt decline in market
liquidity, in maintaining monetary policy trans-
mission, and, ultimately, in helping to prevent
the real economy from sliding into a prolonged
depression. On the other hand, unlimited provi-
sion of central bank liquidity to banks without a
sustainable business model cannot be a long-run
solution. Again, monetary policy should not act
as a substitute for tasks of other policy areas. In
particular, monetary policy should not and cannot
persistently replace the repair of banks’ balance
sheets. The phasing-out of non-standard measures
has to be continued; the objective is to return to
the pre-crisis operational framework which has
proven its effectiveness and flexibility during
the crisis.
Economic Governance in the Euro Area
Needs Reform 
Since the fiscal stabilization measures in
favor of euro-area peripheral countries have
undermined the basic principles of the EMU, it
is obvious that there has to be a fundamental and
far-reaching reform of economic governance in
the euro area. First, the European leaders agreed
that the fiscal rules must be tightened since their
application in practice had proven too weak.
Second, they agreed that macroeconomic imbal-
ances should be addressed earlier and more effec-
tively. The crisis demonstrated that sound public
finances are a necessary, but not sufficient, con-
dition for financial and economic stability. Ireland,
for instance, was among the least-indebted coun-
tries of the euro area before the crisis erupted.
Finally, the leaders agreed to establish a perma-
nent stabilization mechanism since it is an illusion
to believe that a reform of economic governance
Weber
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the future.
In March, the leaders agreed on what they
view as a comprehensive package. Its measures
certainly represent a step in the right direction,
but they are not a “quantum leap towards strength-
ening the institutional framework of EMU”
(European Central Bank, 2010, p. 4), which is
required to reinforce economic governance in
the euro area. Ultimately, the future success of
the EMU will hinge crucially on the member
states’ willingness to comply with the tighter set
of rules.
CONCLUSION
Tomorrow, it will be 17 years ago to the day
since Helmut Schlesinger, one of my predeces-
sors as president of the Bundesbank, gave the
Eighth Homer Jones Memorial Lecture. In his
speech, “On the Way to a New Monetary Union:
The European Union,” he explained the historic
dispute between “monetarists” and “economists”
(Schlesinger, 1994). In the particular context of
European monetary integration, these terms had
a totally different meaning than our general
understanding. “‘Monetarists,’” he explained,
“believed that monetary integration has to start
first and that economic and political integration
would follow.” “‘Economists,’” however, “believed
that economic convergence between the national
economies must occur before…a monetary union.”
The “monetarists” prevailed, but they erred
in their belief that the introduction of the single
currency would automatically act as a locomo-
tive for the political union of Europe. There is no
political union so far and there is little expecta-
tion that this might change significantly in the
foreseeable future. Therefore, national executive
and legislative branches will remain responsible
for economic and fiscal policies over the medium
to long term. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers
beyond the rather moderate and earmarked pay-
ments from the European Union budget (approx-
imately 1 percent of gross national product) are
hardly acceptable; overburdening the financial
solidarity of the people might jeopardize the
idea of European integration.
The “economists,” on the other hand, had a
point in demanding more economic convergence.
Their worries were, by the way, taken into account
by the implementation of convergence criteria
that must be fulfilled before a country can join
the euro area. The underlying problem of the cur-
rent crisis is, however, not a lack of convergence
ex ante or heterogeneity per se; rather, it is the
lack of willingness on the part of a number of
member states to meet the requirements of the
membership in a monetary union. If they fail to
correct these deficiencies swiftly and thoroughly,
stability-oriented monetary policy in the EMU
will become increasingly difficult, all the more
so as monetary policy has been profoundly chal-
lenged by the financial crisis.
The major lessons that central bankers in the
euro area and elsewhere should take to heart are
the following: First, monetary policy has to con-
sider the implications of financial instability for
price stability; monetary and credit aggregates
can provide helpful information in this regard.
Second, since the policy rate remains too blunt a
tool to tackle financial imbalances, the objective
of financial stability requires its own, macropru-
dential set of tools, whereas maintaining price
stability should remain the primary objective of
monetary policy. Third, price stability should
continue to be seen as a stable and low inflation
rate. Finally, without stability-oriented prudent
fiscal policy, it will be increasingly difficult for
monetary policy to ensure price stability at low
interest rates.
Weber
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